When the CPU Breaks Its Own Rules: Security Below the Software Stack
Michael Schwarz
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
04 Nov 2026, 12:15 pm - 1:15 pm
Saarbrücken building E1 5, room 002
Joint Lecture Series
We build secure software on a seemingly obvious assumption: the processor
executes instructions correctly and enforces the boundaries between programs,
operating systems, and virtual machines. But what if the CPU itself breaks
these rules? Over the past decade, research has found increasingly powerful
ways in which processors violate the abstractions on which software relies.
What started with tiny timing differences revealing secrets led to attacks such
as Spectre and Meltdown, and more recently to CPU bugs that can directly
corrupt data, ...
We build secure software on a seemingly obvious assumption: the processor
executes instructions correctly and enforces the boundaries between programs,
operating systems, and virtual machines. But what if the CPU itself breaks
these rules? Over the past decade, research has found increasingly powerful
ways in which processors violate the abstractions on which software relies.
What started with tiny timing differences revealing secrets led to attacks such
as Spectre and Meltdown, and more recently to CPU bugs that can directly
corrupt data, bypass isolation, or expose information across security
boundaries.
In this talk, I will show how seemingly harmless implementation details and useful optimizations turn into practical security vulnerabilities. Using examples from our research across Intel, AMD, and RISC-V processors, I will talk about how we discover and understand CPU vulnerabilities and ultimately turn them into security problems. The broader lesson goes beyond processor security: abstractions are only as strong as the layers implementing them. If we want trustworthy computer systems, hardware must increasingly be tested, analyzed, and secured with the same rigor that we already apply to software.
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In this talk, I will show how seemingly harmless implementation details and useful optimizations turn into practical security vulnerabilities. Using examples from our research across Intel, AMD, and RISC-V processors, I will talk about how we discover and understand CPU vulnerabilities and ultimately turn them into security problems. The broader lesson goes beyond processor security: abstractions are only as strong as the layers implementing them. If we want trustworthy computer systems, hardware must increasingly be tested, analyzed, and secured with the same rigor that we already apply to software.