Anonymity in Mixnets Revisited
Pierfrancesco Ingo
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
15 Jul 2026, 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Saarbrücken building E1 5, room 105
SWS Student Defense Talks - Thesis Proposal
A mix network (mixnet) is a routing network that conceals
communication patterns by shuffling, or mixing, the routes of
concurrently transmitted messages, thereby providing anonymity for
senders, receivers, and sender-receiver pairs. Notable examples of
deployed mixnets are Tor and Nym.
Given the potential use of mixnets in high-stakes applications, such as
protecting whistleblowers, it is essential to establish formal
guarantees of sender anonymity, even against powerful adversaries that
have a full view of the network and are capable of compromising subsets
of mix servers. ...
A mix network (mixnet) is a routing network that conceals
communication patterns by shuffling, or mixing, the routes of
concurrently transmitted messages, thereby providing anonymity for
senders, receivers, and sender-receiver pairs. Notable examples of
deployed mixnets are Tor and Nym.
Given the potential use of mixnets in high-stakes applications, such as
protecting whistleblowers, it is essential to establish formal
guarantees of sender anonymity, even against powerful adversaries that
have a full view of the network and are capable of compromising subsets
of mix servers. However, existing analyses of mixnets anonymity
typically rely on additional mechanisms, such as noise or chaff
messages, or are based on empirical metrics such as entropy, which
cannot provide strong guarantees in the presence of adversaries with
auxiliary information.
My thesis consists of two complementary parts: (1) a first part on
parallel mixnets, in which mix nodes operate in loosely synchronized
rounds, and (2) a second part on continuous-time mixnets, in which mix
nodes operate independently and forward messages after user-specified
random delays.
First, I present a new analysis of horizontally scalable parallel
mixnets, showing that they can achieve strong indistinguishability
guarantees for messages without requiring additional noise messages or
extensive cryptographic techniques. Second, I develop a theoretical
framework for continuous-time mixing by identifying two interacting
stochastic processes that govern mixnets' operation: a local shuffling
process at each mix node, driven by message delays and their sampling,
and a global shuffling process that determines how messages (or batches)
propagate between mixing layers. Building on this perspective, I derive
a new tractable analytical model that captures mixing at both the local
(per-node) and global (system-wide) levels. Finally, I use this model to
establish provable anonymity guarantees for asynchronous mixnets.
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