

# FOUNDATIONAL RESPONSE-TIME ANALYSIS AS EXPLAINABLE EVIDENCE OF TIMELINESS

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Marco Maida, Sergey Bozhko, and Björn B. Brandenburg



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR SOFTWARE SYSTEMS





MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT

# THIS PAPER IN A NUTSHELL

# We introduce Foundational Response-Time Analysis, a new way of implementing response-time analysis tools

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*that:* 1. is inherently **trustworthy** – by design free of analysis or implementation bugs affecting the <u>safety</u> of the results,

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
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a new way of implementing response-time analysis tools

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# **IN A NUTSHELL**

# **MOTIVATION** What is the issue with conventional response-time analysis?

# **RESPONSE-TIME ANALYSIS (RTA)**

#### The goal of an **RTA** is to obtain **safe response-time bounds**

#### as evidence of temporal correctness, *e.g.*, for use in the certification of safety-critical systems.

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**Response-Time** Bound

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
System Model

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**Response-Time** Bound

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


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
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#### **ISSUE 1: RTA IS NOT <u>EXPLAINABLE</u>**



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


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#### → the ability for a human evaluator to inspect and understand the result of a computation

#### **ISSUE 1: RTA IS NOT <u>EXPLAINABLE</u>**

#### Conventional RTA yields just a number...




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#### → the ability for a human evaluator to inspect and understand the result of a computation

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


#### → the ability for a human evaluator to inspect and understand the result of a computation


#### ...so the evaluator must **trust** the process by which the result was obtained.

Should we?

### **ISSUE 2: RTA IS ERROR PRONE**




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


## **ISSUE 2: RTA IS ERROR PRONE**






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




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
# Can we make use of formal verification?

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
# **DESIGN SPACE** How to formally verify an RTA?

#### **PRIOR WORK: VERIFY ONLY THE THEORY** [Cerqueira et al., ECRTS 2016]




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
#### **PRIOR WORK: VERIFY ONLY THE THEORY** [Cerqueira et al., ECRTS 2016]



# **TOUR DE FORCE: VERIFY THE ENTIRE TOOL**




# **TOUR DE FORCE: VERIFY THE ENTIRE TOOL**



### **TOUR DE FORCE: VERIFY THE ENTIRE TOOL**

hypothetical<sup>-</sup>

(never done in prior work)




not easily updated once verified




#### no explainable evidence

(still just a number)

#### **PRIOR WORK: VERIFY A RESULT VALIDATION PROCEDURE** [CertiCAN, Fradet et al., RTAS 2019]




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
Machine-checked proof: sound validation logic





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


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(just a number and the absence of a failure)

#### **PRIOR WORK: VERIFY A RESULT VALIDATION PROCEDURE** [CertiCAN, Fradet et al., RTAS 2019]


Machine-checked proof: sound validation logic




#### combined with unverified "glue code" for I/O, parsing, etc.


# A NEW APPROACH: FOUNDATIONAL RTA

### **DISTANT ANALOGY: SHOW YOUR WORK**







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
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
## **DISTANT ANALOGY: SHOW YOUR WORK**



Idea: report both results and an argument for why the results are correct

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#### **PROOF-CARRYING CODE** [Necula, POPL 1997]




Idea: tool must produce both *results* and *proofs* that the results are correct

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
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#### <u>Trusted Computing Base (TCB)</u> *does not include the compiler*


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
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
does not include the compiler

Ok

Nope

#### → Keep the checker as **simple** as possible!

Proof checker




Idea: tool must produce both *results* and a *foundational proof* of correctness

### **Foundational proof** = proof relies only the foundations of mathematical logic

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


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## THIS PAPER: PROOF-CARRYING RESPONSE-TIME BOUNDS




Idea: RTA must produce both results and a foundational proof of correctness

- → Provably **safe** results
- → Small TCB, not including RTA tool or theory
- → Independently checkable **evidence** of timeliness

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
What logic to use as a foundation? How

How to keep proofs <u>explainable</u>?

...but does it scale?

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- How to automatically generate proofs?

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
....but does it scale?

*Nice concept... but does it actually work?* 

# 

## Prosa Obsigned Evidence of Timeliness

### **POET: FOUNDATIONAL RTA BASED ON PROSA** *Generate proof-carrying response-time bounds based on* <u>*Prosa*</u> and <u>Coq</u>



... *let's have a quick look at Coq and Prosa.* 

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## **BACKGROUND: COQ**

### Coq is a proof assistant

It is used to write programs/definitions and to prove theorems

## The proof engine is not fully automatic!

```
Theorem a_simple_theorem:
  ∀xy,
  x + y = y + x.
Proof.
 move⇒ x y.
  induction x.
  - by rewrite add0n addno. (* base *)
  <u>by</u> rewrite addSn IHx addnS. (* step *)
Qed.
```



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#### Coq checks that proofs are correct

## **BACKGROUND:PROSA**

**Prosa** is the to-date largest

#### machine-checked framework for Real Time Systems Theory

```
Variables (j : Job) (t_1 : instant) (\delta : duration).
(* ... *)
Lemma busy_interval_is_bounded:
  ∃ (t<sub>2</sub> : instant),
     t_2 \leq t_1 + \delta \Lambda
     busy_interval j t_1 t_2.
```

formally proven **PROSA** schedulability analysis

prosa.mpi-sws.org

#### [Cerqueira et al., ECRTS 2016]


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### **POET: FOUNDATIONAL RTA BASED ON PROSA** Generate proof-carrying response-time bounds based on Prosa and Coq

(a) Certificate generation



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(a) Certificate generation POET **YAML** file Coq.v certificates




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
(a) Certificate generation POET **YAML** file Coq.v certificates



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


### **POET: FOUNDATIONAL RTA BASED ON PROSA** Generate proof-carrying response-time bounds based on Prosa and Coq

(a) Certificate generation POET YAML file **Small TCB** 


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


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(a) Certificate generation (b) ( PROSA PROSA POET Coq .v certificates




## **INPUT FILE**



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Policy { scheduling policy: fixed-priority
 preemption policy: fully-preemptive


## **INPUT FILE**



Policy { scheduling policy: fixed-priority
 preemption policy: fully-preemptive

worst-case execution time: 50


## **INPUT FILE**



```
Policy } scheduling policy: fixed-priority
    preemption policy: fully-preemptive
          worst-case execution time: 50
           worst-case execution time: 10
```

arrival curve: [220, [[1,1], [105,2]]]

## **INPUT FILE**




#### **POET** supports arbitrary arrival curves

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y	scheduling policy: fixed-priority preemption policy: fully-preemptive
	- id: 1 worst-case execution time: 50 period: 30 deadline: 100 priority: 2
2	- id: 2 worst-case execution time: 10 arrival curve: [220,[[1,1],[105,2]]]) deadline: 100 priority: 1
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

### **POET: FOUNDATIONAL RTA BASED ON PROSA** Generate proof-carrying response-time bounds based on Prosa and Coq



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## CERTIFICATES






Coq Certificates

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## CERTIFICA




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
<b>TES</b>				
<pre>:= {  d := 1; ost := 10;</pre>	<pre>- id: 1 worst-case execution time: period: 30 deadline: 100 priority: 2</pre>	10		
<pre>eriod := Period eadline := 100; riority := 2  }.</pre>				
:= = [::tsk01,tsk02				

## CERTIFICATES



- id: 1 worst-case execution time: 10 period: 30 deadline: 100 priority: 2 task period := Period 30; task deadline := 100; task\_priority := 2 |}. Let ts := [::tsk01,tsk02].

## CERTIFICATES




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
- id: 1 worst-case execution time: 10 period: 30 deadline: 100 priority: 2 task period := Period 30; task deadline := 100; task\_priority := 2 |}. Let ts := [::tsk01,tsk02].

## CERTIFICATES



```
- id: 1
                                worst-case execution time: 10
                                period: 30
                                deadline: 100
                                priority: 2
  task period := Period 30;
  task deadline := 100;
  task priority := 2 |}.
Let ts := [::tsk01,tsk02].
  \forall A, is_in_search_space tsk L A \rightarrow
     \exists F, rbf tsk (A + \epsilon) + rbf ts tsk (A + F) \leq A + F
          \wedge F \leq R.
```

## CERTIFICATES



MPI-SWS

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```
- id: 1
                                worst-case execution time: 10
                                period: 30
                                deadline: 100
                                priority: 2
  task cost := 10;
  task period := Period 30;
  task deadline := 100;
  task priority := 2 | \}.
Let ts := [::tsk01, tsk02].
  \forall A, is in search space tsk L A \rightarrow
    \exists F, rbf tsk (A + \epsilon) + rbf ts tsk (A + F) \leq A + F
          \wedge F \leq R.
```

## CERTIFICATES

		Let tsk1 := task_id :
	Task set	task_cost task_peri task_dead task_prio Let tsk2 := Let ts := [
	Task under analysis	Let tsk :=
	Response time	Let R := 10
Coq Certificates	Fix-point equation	Lemma R_is_: ∀ A, is_i: ∃ F, rb ∧
	Auto-generated proof	Proof. move ⇒ A 
	Final conclusion	Theorem R_r task_res ∧ R ≤ ta
	Auto-generated proof, again	Proof.

```
- id: 1
                  worst-case execution time: 10
                  period: 30
= { |
                  deadline: 100
:= 1;
                  priority: 2
t := 10;
iod := Period 30;
dline := 100;
ority := 2 |}.
= ...
[::tsk01,tsk02].
tsk1.
0%N.
maximum:
in_search_space tsk L A \rightarrow
bf tsk (A + \epsilon) + rbf ts tsk (A + F) \leq A + F
F \leq R.
SS.
respects deadlines :
sponse_time_bound arr_seq sched tsk R
ask_deadline tsk.
```

### **CERTIFICATES ARE EXPLAINABLE EVIDENCE OF TIMELINESS**

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Coq Certificates

• Certificates are **short** and **readable** Coq files • Certificates are generated **automatically** 

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**Coq Certificates** 

Users obtain formally-verified results without having to know Coq

- Certificates are **short** and **readable** Coq files
- Certificates are generated **automatically** → Users obtain formally-verified results without having to know Cog
- Certificates can be **studied** and **dissected** up until their fundamental axioms → POET generates **explainable** evidence of timeliness



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```
Theorem R respects deadlines :
   task response time bound arr seq sched tsk R
   \wedge R \leq task deadline tsk.
Proof.
  • • •
```



**Coq Certificates** 



- Certificates are **short** and **readable** Coq files
- Certificates are generated **automatically** Users obtain formally-verified results without having to know Coq
- Certificates can be **studied** and **dissected** up until their fundamental axioms → POET generates **explainable** evidence of timeliness
- Certificates **do not depend** on POET We do not need to verify or trust POET



**Coq Certificates** 

## **CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF POET**

### **POET** currently supports:

- Scheduling policies: *Earliest-deadline first (EDF), Fixed-priority (FP)*
- Preemption policies: *Fully preemptive, Fully non-preemptive*
- Workload: *Periodic* and *sporadic* with arbitrary *arrival curves*
- Tasks with *arbitrary deadlines*

irst (EDF), Fixed-priority (FP) Fully non-preemptive

### ... see paper for details!

# EVALUATION

**Goal:** assess scalability of the proposed approach w.r.t. such as number of tasks and utilization

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- Cardinality: 2-40 with step 2 <</p>
- ► Utilization: 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%


(50 tasks in the paper)

**Goal:** assess scalability of the proposed approach w.r.t. such as number of tasks and utilization

- We evaluated **performance of Coq** on  $\approx 7000$ randomly-generated task sets
- Scheduling / preemption policy: {FP, EDF} × {Fully-Pr, Fully Non-Pr}
- Cardinality: 2-40 with step 2
- ► Utilization: 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%
- Workload:
  - This talk: mixed workload .....
  - Paper: two move workload-types

(defined by arrival curves)

### **BRIEF OVERVIEW**




Workload: Mixed workload

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## **BRIEF OVERVIEW**




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
## **OVERALL TREND**



Workload: Mixed workload

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### **OVERALL TREND**




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
## **MAXIMUM RUNTIME**



Workload: Mixed workload


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## **AVERAGE RUNTIME**



Workload: Mixed workload


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Workload: Mixed workload

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## **OVERALL CONCLUSION**



Workload: Mixed workload **# Task sets**: 2000 task sets

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# CONCLUSION

"Naive" proof-oriented computation in Coq is very slow How to speed it up?

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"Naive" proof-oriented computation in Coq is very slow How to speed it up?

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Coq cannot automatically find potential contradictions in analysis assumptions How to defend against conflicting hypotheses?

"Naive" proof-oriented computation in Coq is very slow How to speed it up?

### Coq may accept truncated certificates How to engineer POET in light of this?

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Coq cannot automatically find potential contradictions in analysis assumptions How to defend against conflicting hypotheses?

"Naive" proof-oriented computation in Coq is very slow How to speed it up?

### Coq may accept truncated certificates How to engineer POET in light of this?

### Support for arbitrary arrival curves was not trivial How to compute the search space efficiently?

Coq cannot automatically find potential contradictions in analysis assumptions How to defend against conflicting hypotheses?

## **POET, THE FIRST FOUNDATIONAL RTA TOOL**

### **Summary:**

- POET produces formally-verified response-time bounds
- Bounds are proven correct by automatically generated Coq proofs
- Users do not need to know formal verification

## POET, THE FIRST FOUNDATIONAL RTA TOOL

### Summary:


- POET produces formally-verified response-time bounds
- Bounds are proven correct by automatically generated Coq proofs
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### Future work:

- More complex workloads: synchronization and precedence constraints
- Realistic system models: scheduling overheads and multiprocessor platforms

## onse-time bounds **cally generated Coq proofs** ification

ation and precedence constraints overheads and multiprocessor




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## Back up slides




## **DIFFERENCE IN SEARCH SPACE SIZE**



Workload: Mixed workload

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
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